# How to tax housing ? Property versus rental taxation
**Date de l'événement :** 02/10/2025
* Publié le 02/10/2025

### Image(s)
![Page de garde du mémoire](https://firebasestorage.googleapis.com/v0/b/memory-sp-pr.appspot.com/o/prod%2F1y7CgDOTakHDiB3dgoi0%2FprojectsMedias%2FCee77hqs710nqqnNVJX5%2Fthumbs%2FCapture%20d'%C3%A9cran%202026-02-16%20170944_z27fl_1600x900.png?alt=media&token=f375e08b-11a1-40ad-9df6-58231017eed1) 

## Auteur(s)
Nathanaël Soulage

## Direction
Antoine Ferey

## Description
**Ce mémoire est issu de la sélection des meilleurs mémoires du master d’économie de l'année 2024-2025 :  
  
Abstract**  
  
Starting from the problem of a local government raising taxes to finance its expenditures, we investigate the welfare effects of different housing taxation instruments local governments have at hand, to derive an optimal tax mix. We mainly focus on property tax and rental income tax, in a model featuring both a rental and an owner-occupied housing sector, allowing for imperfect pass-through of the rental tax burden from landlords onto renters.  
  
We analyze budget-neutral reforms that raise property taxes while lowering rental income taxes. Owners face a welfare loss from higher property taxes, partly offset by lower housing prices that reduce the tax base. Renters’ welfare effects depend on the extent to which landlords pass rental taxes onto tenants: higher property taxes increase rental burdens, but these are  
offset by reductions in rental income taxes and lower housing prices; the net effect on renters is ultimately shaped by the pass-through of the tax burden from landlords onto renters.  
  
Eventually, using a tractable application of the model, we characterize how the optimal tax mix varies with the pass through rate on renters. The optimal property tax is zero when pass-through is low, rising monotonically as pass-through increases. The optimal rental income tax follows an inverse U shape, increasing at low pass-through—when renters face limited incidence and the optimal property tax is zero—then declining at high pass-through where incidence shifts onto tenants. Under certain conditions, subsidizing rental housing through negative rental income taxation can be optimal at high pass-through levels.  
  
\[...\]

**Accéder au mémoire en ligne :** [https://www.sciencespo.fr/ecole-recherche/sites/sciencespo.fr.ecole-recherche/files/SOULAGE-Nathanael.pdf](https://www.sciencespo.fr/ecole-recherche/sites/sciencespo.fr.ecole-recherche/files/SOULAGE-Nathanael.pdf)

### Type(s) de ressource
`#Texte` 

### Discipline
`#Économie` 

### Thématique(s)
`#Logement / Immobilier` `#Économies` 

### Langue(s)
`#Anglais` 

### Famille(s) de contenu
`#Recherche` `#Production étudiante` 

### Type(s) d'accès
`#Accès libre` 

## Droits
Les ressources et les images visibles sur Sciences Po Sources sont susceptibles d’être protégées par un droit de propriété intellectuelle (comme par exemple un droit d’auteur ou une marque) qui peuvent appartenir à Sciences Po ou à des tiers. Pour plus de précisions notamment sur les usages autorisés et non autorisés, consulter les [Conditions Particulières d’Utilisation](https://sources.sciencespo.fr/p/cpu).



---
### Navigation pour IA
- [Index de tous les contenus](https://sources.sciencespo.fr/llms.txt)
- [Plan du site (Sitemap)](https://sources.sciencespo.fr/sitemap.xml)
- [Retour à l'accueil](https://sources.sciencespo.fr/)