# How Young European Citizens Propose to Combat Disinformation in Democratic Societies **Date de l'événement :** 18/11/2024 * Publié le 18/11/2024 ### Image ![Conspiracy theories concept. Flow of disinformation and false ideas about coronavirus and covert plans of aliens. Concerned man at laptop. Colored flat vector illustration isolated on white background](https://firebasestorage.googleapis.com/v0/b/memory-sp-pr.appspot.com/o/prod%2F1y7CgDOTakHDiB3dgoi0%2FprojectsMedias%2FjWqLamWpRMudOA7A7oGU%2Fthumbs%2Fshutterstock_1899056305_qhgi8_1600x900.png?alt=media&token=96195dff-4230-4bae-a907-7ca81d9bae1b) ## 2024 is one of the largest election year in history, with no less than **64 countries calling their voters to the polls** and electing their representatives. Online disinformation has become a pervasive and critical threat to **the integrity of democratic processes** worldwide. But can this global challenge really be tackled with a single set of policies, or are differentiated approaches required to effectively protect democratic societies? Building upon the results of a broad open consultation carried out by **Make.org** **and the Sciences Po Tech & Global Affairs Innovation Hub, with support from NATO and Microsoft**, during which 7,865 young citizens from France, Germany, Moldova, and Romania shared their ideas for protecting democracies from disinformation, **Beatriz Botero Arcila** and **Florent Parmentier** deliver in this policy brief an analysis of how different national contexts influence disinformation, its negative impacts and its potential remedies. A growing trend in the disinformation landscape is the **transformative role of artificial intelligence** (AI), which has the potential to enhance the scale, speed, and sophistication of disinformation campaigns while lowering their cost. The evolving use of AI requires careful analysis to understand its potential to manipulate public discourse. A growing body of literature is dedicated to the risks associated with AI-powered disinformation and potential control and mitigation mechanisms. However, while disinformation poses a global challenge, its manifestations are **shaped by local political, informational, and cultural contexts**. In countries with varying levels of democratic consolidation \[...\] the specific nature of disinformation and the corresponding policy solutions differ significantly.  Based on the consultation and their interdisciplinary analysis of the current state of disinformation and the policies adopted (or considered) to counter it across France, Germany, Moldova, and Romania, the authors identified **common solutions** alongside adaptative approaches where resources can nonetheless be mutualised to collectively support democratic debate and pluralistic public spaces. \[...\] **Pour lire l'article complet, cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous :** [https://www.sciencespo.fr/api/portal/uploads/Disinformation_and_Democracy_answering_the_Youth_b53de3a91c.pdf](undefined) ## Auteur(s) Beatriz Botero Arcila, Florent Parmentier ### Date 18/11/2024 ### Type(s) de ressource `#Texte` ### Discipline(s) `#Science politique` `#Droit` ### Thématique(s) `#Numérique et technologie` `#Communication / journalisme / médias` ### Aire(s) géographique(s) `#Europe` ### Langue(s) `#Anglais` ## Crédits photo GoodStudio / Shutterstock ### Famille(s) de contenu `#Recherche` `#Vie publique` ### Type(s) d'accès `#Accès libre` ## Droits Les ressources et les images visibles sur Sciences Po Sources sont susceptibles d’être protégées par un droit de propriété intellectuelle (comme par exemple un droit d’auteur ou une marque) qui peuvent appartenir à Sciences Po ou à des tiers. Pour plus de précisions notamment sur les usages autorisés et non autorisés, consulter les [Conditions Particulières d’Utilisation](https://sources.sciencespo.fr/p/cpu). --- ### Navigation pour IA - [Index de tous les contenus](https://sources.sciencespo.fr/llms.txt) - [Plan du site (Sitemap)](https://sources.sciencespo.fr/sitemap.xml) - [Retour à l'accueil](https://sources.sciencespo.fr/)